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1436Assessing Surge Capacity for Radiation Victims
with Marrow Toxicity
Matthew S. Davids,1 Cullen Case, Jr.,2 Raymond Hornung, III,2
Nelson J. Chao,3 John P. Chute,3 C. Norman Coleman,4 Daniel Weisdorf,5
Dennis L. Confer,2 David M. Weinstock1Hematologists/oncologists would provide essential care for victims of a catastrophic radiation incident, such
as the detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND). The US Radiation Injury Treatment Network
(RITN) is a voluntary consortium of 37 academic medical centers, 8 blood donor centers, and 7 umbilical
cord banks focused on preparedness for radiation incidents. The RITN conducted 2 tabletop exercises to
evaluate response capability after a hypothetical IND detonation in a U.S. city. In the 2008 exercise, medical
centers voluntarily accepted 1757 victims at their institutions, a small fraction of the number in need. In the
2009 exercise, each center was required to accept 300 victims. In response, the centers outlined multiple
strategies to increase bed availability, extend staff and resources, and support family and friends accompany-
ing transferred victims. The exercises highlighted shortcomings in current planning and future steps for
improving surge capacity that are applicable to various mass casualty scenarios.
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‘‘In a strange turn of history, the threat of global
nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear
attack has gone up.Black market trade in nuclear
secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology
to build a bomb has spread.’’ President Barack Obama,
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Detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND)
within a U.S. city could be the greatest disaster in the
country’s history, resulting in hundreds of thousands of
victims with traumatic injury, radiation exposure, or
both [1,2]. Current planning by the U.S. Government
focuses on the response to a 10-kiloton nuclear
explosion, a scenario considered feasible based on
current intelligence [1,3-5]. A 10-kiloton explosion,
similar in magnitude to the detonation over Hiroshima
[6-8], would cause massive infrastructure damage
within a radius of 1-2 miles (Figure 1). Many persons
within this radius would sustain both traumatic and
radiation injuries, the combination of which portends
a particularly poor prognosis [9].
Less severe damage, including glass breakage,
would extend 5 or more miles from the detonation
(Figure 1). Car accidents would be very common as
drivers within eyesight of the explosion experienced
‘‘flash’’ blindness. Importantly, many victims with
traumatic injury farther away from the detonation
would have no radiation exposure [4].
Finally, a ground-level detonation would create
a large mushroom cloud that would shower radioactive
fallout along the direction of upper-level winds. The
highest levels of radioactivity would fall within 10-20
miles of the explosion (Figure 1). Victims in this
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Figure 1. Triage after detonation of an improvised nuclear device.
Extensive infrastructure damage would be confined to the region imme-
diately surrounding ground zero. The fallout zone would be defined by
upper-level winds that direct the mushroom cloud. Patient movement is
indicated by arrows. Victims would be evacuated to assembly centers
and regional medical centers, where they would undergo initial assess-
ment and decontamination. Those who had sustained significant radiation
exposure and required specialized care for marrow toxicity would be
prioritized for transfer to RITN centers across the country.
Figure 2. Medical centers, donor centers, and umbilical cord blood
banks participating in the RITN.
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most would lack traumatic injury. Infrastructure
within this zone would remain essentially intact. The
U.S. Strategic National Stockpile Working Group
estimated that the number of victims with radiation
exposure within the fallout zone could exceed
250,000 [1].
Moderate doses of radiation (ie, 2-6 Gy) can induce
a prodrome of symptoms, including nausea, vomiting,
and fatigue, within minutes to hours after exposure.
However, life-threatening manifestations of acute radia-
tion syndrome, such as leukopenia and profuse diarrhea,
would not develop for several days. Thus, radiation-
exposed victims would have a window of opportunity
to evacuate and then obtain medical care in regions
outside the disaster zone. Presumably, many victims
would simply drive themselves away from the area.
Others would be subject to government-organized
evacuation from local assembly centers and medical
centers (Figure 1).
Decontamination of radioactive fallout (which
looks like grains of sand) can be achieved simply by
showering and changing clothes. Thus, it seemswholly realistic and quite likely that there would be
a large number of victims who lacked traumatic and
burn injuries, were not contaminated with radioactiv-
ity, and sustained clinically meaningful, but potentially
survivable, radiation exposure. These victims would
experience varying degrees of bone marrow toxicity,
and thus would be best served by care involving
specialists in hematology/oncology [5,10,11].RITN
The US Radiation Injury Treatment Network
(RITN) [5] was formed in 2006 through collaboration
between the National Marrow Donor Program and
the American Society for Blood and Marrow Trans-
plantation, in partnership with the Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) [3]. The goals
of the RITN are to heighten preparedness and provide
surge capacity after a radiation incident, with a specific
focus on the victims who were exposed to radiation but
lack extensive traumatic and burn injuries. The RITN
is intended not to assist first responders in the first
24-48 hours after an IND detonation, but rather to
support the management of irradiated victims seeking
care across the country days to weeks later.
The RITN is a voluntary consortium comprising
37 adult and pediatric medical centers with expertise
in hematology/oncology and hematopoietic stem cell
transplantation (HSCT), 8 blood donor centers, and 7
umbilical cord blood banks (Figure 2; additional infor-
mation available at www.RITN.net) [5,12]. All of the 37
RITN medicals centers are academic institutions with
extensive medical/surgical, hematology/oncology, and
critical care capacity. RITN centers also include 817
of the 2193 total HSCT beds (37.3%) available at the
127 medical centers in the US National Marrow
Donor Program.
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Figure 3. Voluntary participation in the 2008 exercise. There was no
correlation between the number of HSCT beds at a center and either
the number of victims that could be accepted at that center within 48
hours or the number of staff who could be cross-trained to care for
victims.
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Detonation of an IND within the United States
would initiate a broad civilian and military response
[2]. The DHHS has primary responsibility for the
medical component of this response [7]. Federal assets,
including the Public Health Service, Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, and Strategic National
Stockpile, would be mobilized to support state and
local resources. U.S. military and National Guard
units would assist with triage, evacuation, and security,
and the Veterans Administration would provide
additional surge capacity.
DHHS planners expect that approximately 30,000
victims would be triaged to the RITN (ie, 800 per cen-
ter), either for management at the 37 RITN centers or
for transfer to secondary facilities proximal to RITN
centers (Figure 1). According to current plans, victims
with a high likelihood of radiation exposure (based on
geographic location and/or prodromal symptoms)
who lacked traumatic and burn injuries would be pri-
oritized for triage to the RITN [3,12]. These victims
would require supportive measures (eg, antibiotics,
growth factors, blood products, nutritional support)
[1,10,11,13], which could necessitate hospitalization
or might be manageable in outpatient clinics.
The RITN conducted tabletop exercises in 2008
and 2009 to define the preparedness, capacity, and will-
ingness of centers to participate in the care of radiation
victims. The victims in these exercises were primarily
those with radiation injury only. The tabletop exercises
also were used to elicit innovative approaches for
responding to large numbers of victim transfers.MATERIALS AND METHODS
In April 2008 and March 2009, the tabletop exer-
cises were distributed to the RITN centers. The full
exercises and additional response data are provided in
the Supplemental Information, and also are available
at http://www.nmdp.org/RITN/REFERENCE/index.
html. For both exercises, each RITN center organized
a meeting of clinicians and hospital administrators to
address the fictional scenario and answer a series of
detailed questions. Centers were allowed approximately
3 months from receipt of the scenario to organize and
hold their meeting and then enter their responses online
through www.surveymonkey.com.
Both scenarios involved a 10-kiloton IND detona-
tion in a U.S. city. In 2008, centers were asked to esti-
mate the number of victims that they could voluntarily
accept as transfers. In contrast, the 2009 exercise man-
dated that each center accept 300 fictional victims within
2 days. In both scenarios, victims had either self-
evacuated or undergone government-organized evacua-
tion to triage centers, where they underwent any neces-
sary decontamination before transfer.RESULTS
2008 Exercise
All 37 RITN centers participated in the 2008 exer-
cise, with 426 staff members involved (median, 9.5 staff
per center). The exercise called for the RITN to col-
lectively accept 5000 victim transfers. In total, the 37
RITN centers voluntarily accepted only 1757 victims
within 48 hours. Sixteen centers (43.2%) accepted 20
or fewer victims. The number of victims accepted by
the centers varied widely (range, 3-200) and did not
correlate with each center’s HSCT capacity (Figure 3).
The number of staff members available to care for
radiation victims differed markedly among centers
(median, 31 per center; range, 1-282). Rapid cross-
training of staff who lack expertise in the management
of cytopenias could increase surge capacity. The num-
ber of staff that could be cross-trained varied widely
among the centers (median, 20; range, 0-1100). The
number of staff that could be cross-trained also did
not correlate with HSCT capacity (Figure 3).2009 Exercise
All 37 RITN centers again participated, and the
total number of staff involved increased to 601 (median,
11.5 per center). The exercise focused on approaches to
coping with the mandatory acceptance of 300 victims at
each center. Plans to increase bed availability included
off-loading of existing inpatients to other medical
centers (83.8%), off-loading of some victim transfers
to other medical centers (78.4% of centers), rapid
discharge of existing inpatients (43.2%), and cancella-
tion of elective admissions and procedures (18.9%)
(Table 1). Approximately one-half of the centers
Table 1. Selected Answers to the 2009 Exercise and Future Steps to Improve Response
Plans to increase bed availability Authority who designates altered standards
Activate additional space designated for surge: Chief Cooperating Officer
 Chemotherapy suite Chief Executive Officer
 Simulation lab Chief Medical Officer
 Emergency department Chief Nursing Officer
 Procedure areas Chief of Medical Staff
 Closed medicine ward Chief of Professional Services
Treat neutropenic patients as outpatients Chief of Staff
Rapid discharge of existing patients Clinical Director
Cancel elective admissions and surgeries Corporate Emergency Operations Center team
Transfer existing patients to other wards in hospital Director of Emergency Preparedness
Cancel outpatient visits and utilize outpatient space Director of Environmental Health and Safety
Change private rooms to semiprivate rooms Disaster Planning Officer
Place Emergency Department on diversion Emergency Operations Commander
Executive Medical Director
Plans for managing family needs Hospital President
Involve American Red Cross
House Coordinator
Utilize local hotel(s)
Incident Commander
Elicit assistance from hospital departments:
Medical Director
 Social work Medical Director of the Command Center
 Pastoral care Senior Medical Leadership
 Patient/guest services System Director
 Volunteer services Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs
Shelter family members in:
Vice President for Patient Care
 Preexisting local shelters No formal policy
 ACS Hope Lodge, Hospitality Houses
 Sports venues, convention centers, gymnasiums, schools,
churches
Future steps to improve response
 Dormitories
Formalize plans for patient off-loading
 State Fair grounds
Standardize approaches for staff cross-training
Establish family assistance center
Develop standardized pocket guide
Crisis counseling and behavioral health support plan
Formalize plans for crisis standards of care
Utilize local disaster psychiatry resource
Clarify reimbursement process
Website for family member communication
Establish formal contacts with local disaster response agencies
Involve local police
Full exercises and additional response data are available in the Supplementary Information and at http://www.nmdp.org/RITN/REFERENCE/index.html.
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affiliated hospitals. Various other creative responses
were elicited, and multiple strategies for supporting
friends and family who traveled with victims to RITN
centers were reported as well (Table 1).
The management of 300 victims likely would
require implementation of alternate standards of
care. Twenty centers (54.1%) had a preexisting written
plan for implementing alternate standards. In response
to the question ‘‘what position at your hospital autho-
rizes altered standards of care?,’’ 24 different positions
were mentioned by the 37 centers (Table 1). Of these,
Chief Medical Officer (16.2%) was the most common.
When asked what constitutes an acceptable patient-to-
nurse ratio for neutropenic patients in stable condition
during a national emergency of this nature, all but
2 responses were between 3:1 and 8:1.DISCUSSION
In the aftermath of a massive disaster like a nuclear
detonation, there would be a national call for surge ca-
pacity. An optimal response to this call would involve
large and small centers, both civilian and military,
across the country. The results from our tabletopexercises highlight both the difficulties of accepting
large numbers of victim transfers and the innovative
planning underway at individual RITN centers. It
is worth noting that many victims would simply self-
evacuate, using whatever means available. As was
observed after Hurricane Katrina, these victims would
create a nationwide diaspora independent of the
orchestrated government response. Thus, centers
should expect to encounter victims whether or not
they participate in the RITN [14].
Many of the logistic, financial, and ethical concerns
related to the management of radiation victims have not
yet been fully addressed. For example, victims who re-
ceive moderate doses of radiation are optimal candidates
for triage to RITN centers, yet existing technologies for
determining an individual victim’s absorbed dose are
highly limited. Counting the number of dicentric chro-
mosomes in metaphase spreads of peripheral blood lym-
phocytes can accurately estimate radiation dose [15].
However, this assay is time-consuming, requires multi-
ple days for turnaround, and is performed in only a few
specialized laboratories.
New technologies for rapidly estimating radiation
dose are currently under development [16,17]. For
now, the goal of radiation triage would be to ‘‘bin’’
victims into groups that were exposed to little or no
1440 Biol Blood Marrow Transplant 16:1436-1441, 2010M. S. Davids et al.radiation, absorbed invariably lethal doses, or were in
a middle group [3,4]. This binning could be
performed using a combination of geographic
dosimetry, symptomatology (especially time from
possible exposure to vomiting) and, if available,
lymphocyte counts [1]. Online algorithms for estimat-
ing dose based on these factors are available on the
Radiation Event Medical Management web site
(http://www.remm.nlm.gov/ars_wbd.htm) [4], as are
treatment algorithms, decorporation protocols, tem-
plate admission orders, and information on a range
of radiation events.
In the 2008 exercise, the acceptance of victim
transfers was voluntary, and centers tended to be con-
servative, with fewer than 2000 victims accepted by the
full network. This relatively low number may reflect
a general nihilism in terms of response to an IND
among some practitioners and administrators. In our
experience, this nihilism frequently derives from 2
misguided notions: that the chaos erupting after the
event would be so widespread as to preclude the evac-
uation of essentially any victims, and that all irradiated
victims would also have severe burns, traumatic injury,
and/or radioactive contamination. Dispelling these
notions is a primary goal of the RITN.
Of more practical concern, financial reimburse-
ment for victim care is not guaranteed by the federal
government. In the current health care economic
environment, the risk that victim care might not be
reimbursed may have adversely affected the willing-
ness of some centers to accept victim transfers.
Most health care institutions are already at or near
patient capacity, suggesting that an influx of victim
transfers would rapidly limit their ability to provide
routine care to all patients. Very difficult decisions
would be required as centers shifted from routine
care to alternate standards of care [2,18-20]. Only
one-half of centers have formal plans for implementing
altered standards of care, and the institutional hierar-
chies for decision-making vary widely. This variation
would be a potential source of confusion in the after-
math of a mass casualty event.
Although multiple governmental and nongovern-
mental groups have recently proposed altered stan-
dards for the aftermath of mass casualty incidents
[2,18,20], a legal framework for implementing these
guidelines is lacking. The 2008 exercise required
each center to balance the needs of distant radiation
victims with those of its institution and local patient
population. Thus, it was not surprising that
voluntary acceptance of transfers and cross-training
of staff differed markedly between centers and did
not correlate with the number of HSCT beds
(Figure 3), which we used as a surrogate for overall
capacity. It is noteworthy that some centers addressed
the task vigorously, using stretch goals and creativity to
accept more transfers.Simple approaches to increase resources, staff,
and bed capacity can markedly improve crisis response
[21-23]. In the 2009 exercise, centers offered multiple
strategies to cope with 300 mandatory transfers;
however, very few centers were willing to accept
a patient:nurse ratio .8:1 for hospitalized neutropenic
patients. If hundreds of victims were transferred to
each RITN center, maintaining ratios \8:1 would
require effective strategies, such as cross-training
of staff and expanded outpatient care to reduce
hospitalizations.
Most centers are also planning to transfer some
victims and/or existing in-patients to other regional
hospitals (ie, secondary transfer). The secondary trans-
fer of large numbers of patients indicates that an IND
detonation would affect both large academic and
smaller community hospitals. As such, community
and regional hospitals should be involved in the plan-
ning, with the understanding that national shortages
might simultaneously compromise the availability of
myeloid growth factors, medical supplies, and blood
products. Although predicting the extent of these short-
ages is difficult, one potentially mitigating factor is that
undirected donation of blood products would likely
increase substantially because of a swelling of public
support, as occurred after the attacks of September
11, 2001 [24].
There are several limitations to our study. Among
these, the wide variability in responses to the 2008
exercise might reflect differences among centers in
terms of how seriously they approached the questions.
Alternatively, centers might have very different
attitudes regarding their role after a disaster of this
magnitude. Centers that offered to accept large num-
bers of victims might have taken a more utilitarian
approach, considering that the prognosis for otherwise
healthy victims who received moderate doses of radia-
tion is likely superior to the prognosis for many
patients with relapsed or refractory malignancies.
Another study limitation is that we focused only
on the scenario deemed as the greatest threat by the
U.S. government—detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear
device. The response to other scenarios, such as contam-
ination of food or water with a radioactive isotope,
would necessitate major changes from the IND
response. Even an IND detonation within an airplane
would dramatically alter the spectrum of victim injuries
compared with a ground-level detonation.
Finally, our scenarios are limited to a very small
component of the overall IND response. The exercises
ignore the many complications in victim sorting, man-
agement, and evacuation that would certainly develop
in the aftermath of an IND detonation. Unpredictable
factors, such as inclement weather, crime, and infec-
tious disease, can become important during a mass
casualty incident, as observed after Hurricane Katrina
and the earthquake in Haiti. Future exercises will
Biol Blood Marrow Transplant 16:1436-1441, 2010 1441Radiation Surge Capacityaddress additional factors germane to RITN efforts
(Table 1), including the collection, processing, and
distribution of blood products, and the relationships
between RITN centers and local health, police, and
emergency response agencies.
In conclusion, the tabletop exercises performed by
the RITN in 2008 and 2009 highlight many of the con-
cerns and limitations inherent to accepting victim
transfers after a mass casualty incident. When required
to accept 300 victims each, the RITN centers outlined
several strategies for enhancing surge capacity. These
strategies should be incorporated more broadly into
emergency response plans.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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